Main Reasons for the Transformation of Mandatory Hungarian Private Pension Funds by Novoszath, Peter
207Novoszath, P. (2016). Main Reasons for the Transformation of Mandatory 
Hungarian Private Pension Funds. 
International Public Administration Review, 14(2–3), 207–225.
Main Reasons for the Transformation 
of Mandatory Hungarian Private 
Pension Funds
Peter Novoszath
National University of Public Service, Budapest, Hungary
Novoszath.Peter@uni-nke.hu
ABSTRACT
The main purpose of writing this paper was to provide a clear summary 
of the main facts and motives of restructuring the financing of Hungarian 
social security system which has been in process since 2010. One of the 
main lessons learned from the development of the Hungarian pension 
system so far is that the mandatory private pension funds working on 
the basis of a funded scheme were not able to solve the problems whose 
solution they were established for. In addition, they caused further 
problems.
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1 Introduction
In addition to determining the effectiveness of Hungarian mandatory private 
pension funds there was another important objective of this study to clarify 
the extent of effectiveness of the system in solving the demographic problem. 
The analysis of the demographic problem can be found in Barr (1979, 2002, 
2012) and European Commission (2010, 2012, 2014, 2016) studies. According 
to the previous approach it is commonly referred to funded pension schemes 
as safer than the PAYG mechanism. In contrast, today it is widely known 
that the financial and capital market crisis negatively influenced the extent 
of interest rates and various social security funds’ financial stability and 
regression of the yields. Which had serious consequences particularly for the 
multi-pillar pension schemes and pension assets return.
Only five countries had positive returns on the pension funds between 2008 
and 2011, while in others, by contrast, a significant decrease occurred (Natali 
& Stamati, 2013). It is striking, however, that between 2002 and 2007, in five 
countries, the United Kingdom (0.3%), Czech Republic (1.3%), Hungary (2.1%), 
Austria (2.2%) and Germany (2.6%) the pension funds had only relatively low 
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return, the average net rate of return was of less than 3% could be achieved. 
The extremely greatest negative impact was in 2008, then a partial recovery 
period followed and then once again negative returns associated became 
characteristic of market uncertainty in 2011. The most adverse effects 
occurred in those countries where in investment portfolio of pension funds 
there was an outstanding weight (30% or greater ratio) of listed shares in 
stock exchange.
Therefore pension funds produced the worst yields in Ireland (−35.7%), 
Bulgaria (−32.3%), Belgium (−22.3%), Estonia (−23.1%) and Hungary (−21.7 %) 
in 2008. These processes worsened significantly with demographic problems, 
thereby making the pension system’s long-term unsustainable (European 
Commission, 2012).
Table 1: The development of the pension funds' actual net rate of return in some EU 
countries
Average 
return 
2002–2007
2008 2009 2010 2011 Total return 2008–2011
Austria 2.2 –14.4 7.3 3.7 –6.0 –10.0
Belgium 4.7 –22.3 13.4 4.4 –4.6 –12.0
Bulgaria 4.6 –32.3 5.6 2.5 –3.0 –28.0
Czech 
Republic 1.3 –1.5 –0.6 –1.2 0.5 –2.0
Denmark 3.9 5.1 1.2 7.1 12.1 27.0
Estonia 6.5 –23.1 13.2 2.5 –7.9 –17.0
Finland 4.3 –19.7 14.0 7.1 –4.4 –6.0
Greece n.a. 2.3 0.3 –7.8 –5.6 –10.0
The 
Netherlands 4.1 –17.3 11.5 8.8 8.2 8.0
Ireland –7.3 –35.7 : : : :
Latvia : : : 18.6 –6.6 10.0
Poland 9.4 –17.3 8.9 7.2 –9.1 –12.0
Luxembourg 10.4 –11.3 6.5 0.7 –2.2 –7.0
Hungary 2.1 –21.7 12.8 4.2 –0.5 –8.0
Germany 2.6 0.5 3.9 3.4 : 7.0
Italy : –5.3 5.3 1.2 –2.8 –1.0
Portugal 4.4 –13.2 11.6 –3.0 –7.3 –12.0
Romania : 10.7 10.3 8.5 –0.3 32.0
Slovakia –0.1 –8.9 1.0 0.0 –3.8 –11.0
Slovenia –1.0 –5.4 4.2 1.8 –1.8 –1.0
Spain : –9.9 6.9 –2.2 –2.2 –7.0
United 
Kingdom 0.3 –0.9 –0.9 –2.1 –2.5 –6.0
Source: Natali & Stamati (2013, p. 16)
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Due to the protracted crisis in the period 2008 to 2011, the countries met with 
the worst results, which had the highest proportion of stock market securities 
in their portfolio and was the least pursued a conservative investment 
policy. So mainly in Bulgaria (–28%), in Estonia (−17%), in Belgium, in Poland 
and in Portugal (equally −12%), in Slovakia (−11%), in Austria (−10%) and in 
Hungary (−8%) it decreased the most actual net return on the pension funds 
in this four-year period. Before the crisis, in almost all EU Member States, 
the pension fund's portfolio dramatically increased the share of the stock 
market instruments. For example, in Bulgaria in 2007 it increased 11-fold in 
the proportion of listed securities compared to 2003 in the pension funds 
portfolio, while in Poland four times. But the majority of the 27 EU Member 
States have at least doubled their share. After the financial and economic 
crisis, this trend was reversed, and in many countries  the proportion of these 
instruments decreased more than half. The least in Sweden (23%) and the UK 
(24%), while the most in Slovenia (by 78%) and Greece (87% respectively). In 
general it can be said that European pension funds due to the crisis increasingly 
began to turn in the direction of safer forms of investment, and therefore the 
share of government bonds was raised from over 50% of their assets.
2 Did Hungary Follow Argentina’s Example?
Several analysts think that Hungary followed in the footsteps of Argentina in 
terms of restructuring the pension funds system when giving an ultimatum to 
employees that they could lose their entitlement to state pension unless they 
step back into the state pension funds system (Equality Law, 2010; Simon, 
2010; Simonovits, 2011). According to these analysts’ opinions, when Hungary 
took over the rather significant amount of assets of private pension funds, it 
followed the example of Argentina, whose government solved the problems 
arising from the negative consequences of the 2008 global financial crisis by 
nationalising the 24 billion USD wealth of Argentine private pension funds 
instead of taking huge loans again. The government of Argentina did so in 
October 2008, when Hungary was the first in Europe to request help from IMF 
and took a loan of approximately 25 billion USD in order to avoid bankruptcy. 
Therefore, those analysts would be right if Hungary had acted the same way 
as Argentina in order to avoid having to take this extremely huge loan from 
IMF and the EU. As it can be seen in the Argentine example, the Hungarian 
government at that time had this opportunity even then. However, it is a fact 
that if Hungary had chosen the Argentine way in the autumn of 2008, they 
should not have taken any IMF and EU loans and the debt of Hungary would 
have been less by 25 billion USD; therefore, the repayment of new loans 
would have meant significantly less burden for the state budget.
There is another important difference between the two countries, which is 
that Argentina actually nationalised private pension funds, while Hungary did 
not. Every member had the option of remaining a member of private pension 
funds if they wanted to. Even today, there are numerous private pension 
210 International Public Administration Review, Vol. 14, No. 2–3/2016
Peter Novoszath
funds operating in the country with a member list of around 70 thousand 
people. A Hungarian citizen filed a complaint in this matter which the 
Strasbourg European Human Rights Court dismissed on 13th January 2013 
on the grounds that no rights to private property were violated (Hungarian 
Government – Ministry of Public Administration and Justice, 2013). 
3 Reasons for the Modification of Formerly Mandatory 
Hungarian Private Pension Funds
In 2006, Hungarian macroeconomist János Kun drew the attention of the 
Hungarian government at the time to the fact that the private pension fund 
system established in Hungary is unprecedented in developed European 
countries (Kun, 2009). In developed European countries, there were voluntary 
private pension funds which made payments into the pension funds based 
on a sectoral agreement, a voluntary decision or a direct agreement with the 
employer. However, this payment was voluntary from all aspects and was not 
stipulated by law. Furthermore, it definitely did not result in a loss in the state 
pension fund. Since the amount of pension received by pensioners did not 
decrease when mandatory private pension funds appeared, the Hungarian 
social security system realised a loss in each subsequent year. In the beginning, 
active employees paid 6% to private pension funds, which then increased to 
7% from 2003 and 8% from 2004. These amounts were missing from the 
pension payments of the given year.
Table 2: Changes of the rules of becoming a member of private pension funds in 
Hungary 
Period Mandatory membership of career-starters
Establishing voluntary 
membership
Before 1st January 1998 Establishing membership was not mandatory
If the conditions set out in PPA* 
exist, membership can only be 
established voluntarily 
1st January 1998– 
31st December 2001
Establishing membership was 
mandatory
Membership can also be 
established voluntarily if the 
conditions set out in PPA* exist
1st January 2002– 
31st December 2002
Establishing membership was 
not mandatory
If the conditions set out in PPA* 
exist, membership can only be 
established voluntarily
1st January 2003– 
2nd November 2010
Establishing membership was 
mandatory
Membership can also be 
established voluntarily if the 
conditions set out in PPA* exist
3rd November 2010– Establishing membership was not mandatory
If the conditions set out in PPA* 
exist, membership can only be 
established voluntarily
31st December 2011– Establishing membership is not mandatory
Membership can only be 
established voluntarily, PPA 
does not stipulate any specific 
conditions thereto
* Act LXXXII of 1997 on Private Pensions and Private Pension Funds (PPA) which came into force on 
1st September 1997.
Source: PSZÁF (2012)
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Membership fees were deducted from pension fund members’ wages by 
their employers and transferred directly to the given private pension fund in 
the period between 1st January 1998 and 31st December 2006. Starting from 
1st December 2007, employers transferred the membership fees to the tax 
authorities and they transferred them further to private pension funds. The 
regulation of the amount of membership fee was included in paragraph 3 of 
the Act LXXX of 1997 on the Eligibility for Social Security Benefits and Private 
Pensions and the Funding for These Services.
In Hungary, in the structure established on 1st January 1998, the pension 
contributions paid by those entering the mixed system were divided. One 
part of the contribution was not paid into the social security pension system 
which operated on the basis of the ‘pay as you go’ principle, but it was 
credited to and individual fund account as private pension fund membership 
fee. According to the structure, around one quarter of contributions were 
paid into private pension funds. Therefore, private pension fund benefits 
should have covered the social security benefits which were around 25% 
lower. According to the 1998 plans, the second pillar would have gradually 
covered an increasing proportion of members until all of them were covered. 
Only career starters would have been obliged to enter the system. However, 
the actual legal regulations made it possible for everyone to freely decide 
to enter the mixed system until the middle of 1999. Nevertheless, those 
stepping into the mixed system had to face the fact that their future pension 
will decrease by 25% even if they had paid the whole pension contribution 
into the social security pension funds system before their voluntary entered 
the mixed system (Magyarorszag Kormanya, 2012, p. 106).
However, the number of people stepping into the mixed system in 1998–
1999 did not live up to the expectations. There were many cases when 
people decided to enter the mandatory private pension fund system even if 
it was not a favourable choice for them. The fundamental reason for doing 
so was the rather single-sided information campaign related to introducing 
the pension reform, emphasising only the advantages of individual accounts 
and inheritance and neglecting the risks of entering the mandatory pension 
fund system. The declared purpose of establishing the funded pension pillar 
was to contribute to the financeability of the pension system. However, when 
setting the long-term objective, it should have been taken into consideration 
that there would be several decades of deficit in the state pension pillar 
following the introduction of this system. Although part of the contribution of 
members entering the mixed system was already transferred to their private 
pension fund accounts, the expense obligations of the state pillar remained 
unchanged. Extra expenses would have been eliminated only gradually and 
over a very long time, around 5-6 decades. Following this point of time, the 
costs saved as a result of lower benefits would have compensated for the 
deficit. In Hungary, due to the high number of people entering the mixed 
system, the amount of deficit – the extra burden of the social security pension 
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system – significantly increased during a short amount of time. The member 
list reached 50% of all insured members even by 2000, the second year after 
the introduction of the system and it gradually reached more than 60% by 
2010. The deficit of the ‘pay as you go’ pension pillar gradually increased as 
a result of the loss of return and it reached 1% of GDP by 2004, while it was 
close to 1.3% of GDP by 2009.
The loss arising from contributions transferred to private pension funds 
was compensated for by the Hungarian state budget to the social security 
system every year. The financial loss arising this way increased from year 
to year. Based on the reports of the Hungarian Central Administration of 
National Pension Insurance (2015), the amount of contributions transferred 
to the mandatory private pension funds was 297 495 million HUF in 2007, 
330 333.2 million HUF in 2008 and 354 099.1 million HUF in 2009. The amount 
of transferred contributions would have been 372 380 million HUF in 2010 if 
the government had not shut down the transfer of contributions to private 
pension funds and directed them to the state budget. Furthermore, the 
amount of loss in 2010 would have increased despite the fact that the then 
government took significant measures to reduce pension expenditures in 
2009. The Hungarian mandatory pension funds system caused a nearly 2000 
billion deficit to the state budget between 2004 and 2010. Furthermore, 
the standard of social security services deteriorated, the pensionable age 
increased and the purchasing power of pensions started to decrease during 
this period.
Table 3: The Hungarian budgetary deficit (against GDP percentage) 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Budgetary deficit 
(without private pension funds) 6.79 8.14 4.21 2.15 2.79 2.71
Budgetary deficit caused by 
private pension funds 1.11 1.17 0.79 1.68 1.26 1.38
Source: Nagy (2010, p. 11)
The deficit of the Hungarian state budget would have increased further 
for several years until those not members of private pension funds retire; 
therefore, they pay their whole pension contributions into the state system 
and receive their whole pension from the state pillar, while they take their 
place in the private pension fund members who paid part of their pension 
contributions into private pension funds. Therefore, this process would have 
been uninterrupted until all pensioners had been members of private pension 
funds. According to certain calculations, this process could have lasted until 
even 2040. Furthermore, the interest of the state debt increasing as a result 
of the deficit caused by private pension funds burdened the state budget 
with further hundreds of billions and they would have burdened the budget 
by further thousands of billions until 2040.
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The average yearly return of mandatory private pension funds was only 0.1% 
in the ten-year-long period between December 2001 and December 2010, 
while the amount of return was negative (−1.6% on average) in the five-year-
long period between 2007 and 2011. In the ten-year-long period, the yearly 
return of private pension funds was −1.3% in the United States, −0.6% in 
Spain and −0.1% in the United Kingdom. At the same time, the return realised 
in the same period was only between 0% and 1% in three other countries 
(Hungary – 0.4%, Czech Republic – 0.5% and Austria – 0.9%). In four other 
countries, private pension funds generated returns of only 1% or around 1% 
between December 2002 and December 2010 (Iceland – 1%, New Zealand – 
1.2%, Switzerland – 1.3% and South Korea – 1.2%).
Graph 1: Average annual real net investment return of pension funds in selected 
OECD countries (Dec 2001 – Dec 2010 and Dec 2007 – Jun 2011)
Source: OECD, (2012, p. 21; [Excel file] DOI: 10.1787/888932598113)
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According to the study of EuroFinuse (European Federation of Financial 
Services Users), the European representative body of people using financial 
services, these results are especially worrisome in the case of various countries 
because the OECD did not consider other fees and taxes which further reduce 
the return of private pension funds. For this reason, the actual return was 
even lower than reported by OECD (Berthon, Cronin, Prache, Struwe, & Viver, 
2013).
The investment losses have a direct negative impact on the pension income 
of many pensioners, especially those who take part in a defined contribution 
(DC) program until their retirement. From month to month, it became 
obvious in an increasing number of countries that the mandatory private 
pension funds system was not working as expected. As a matter of course, 
the unsustainability of this system was first sensed by countries which were 
highly indebted and/or struggled with a significant deficit in their budget. As 
a result of the capital market processes in 2008 and 2009, the value of the 
mandatory private pension funds savings quickly decreased. This practical 
experience was the opposite of what they had previously heard about the 
advantages and safety of the mandatory private pension funds system. The 
members were not given any unambiguous promise for the period until the 
determination of the amount of pension. As regards future processes, they 
only had limited guarantee concerning the future increase of savings. This 
process greatly diminished society’s trust in the mandatory private funded 
pension pillar in Hungary. A significant doubt emerged in a large proportion 
of pension fund members about whether the savings collected with the 
mandatory private pension fund system really helped them in establishing the 
financial background for a decent old age. The decrease of the accumulated 
savings and the loss of the society’s trust happened also in other countries 
operating the mandatory funded pension pillar.
As the result of a 2009 study, OECD described the high cost level of the 
Hungarian mandatory private pension funds system as a negative example 
(OECD, 2009). Of all mandatory pension funds systems, members had to pay 
the highest administrative and management costs in Hungary, amounting to 
around 2% of the wealth managed by the system, while the fees were the 
lowest in Sweden (less than 0.5% of the managed wealth).
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Graph 2: Administrative charges in selected OECD and non-OECD countries, 2007 
(As percentage of total assets)
Note: (1) Data refer to the year 2006
Source: OECD (2009, p. 17; [Excel file] DOI: 10.1787/517052344408)
Mostly as a consequence of the above described actions, the return of 
Hungarian mandatory private pension funds was especially low in the 
13-year-long period between 1997 and 2010 and did not even on par with 
inflation; therefore, it had a negative return. None of the mandatory private 
pension funds operating in Hungary reached the level the index of short-term 
government bonds (RMAX), but they were significantly lower. Consequently, 
Hungarian mandatory private pension fund members would have been better 
off if these funds had invested the savings of their members into Hungarian 
government bonds (Magyarorszag Kormanya, 2012, p. 6).
The assumption that the conversion to a capitalised private pension funds 
system will automatically reduce the evasion of the payment of contributions 
proved to be wrong. Also, after the drastic reduction of benefits, the issue of 
maintaining the standard of future benefits gave grounds for serious concern 
and the measures of the previous governments resulting in the reduction of 
pensions and their value in real terms further increased these concerns.
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Table 4: Average return of Hungarian private pension funds for 10 and 13 years 
considering the whole deposit
Nominal 
return % 
(10 years)
Nominal 
return % 
(13 years)
Real return % 
(10 years)
Real return % 
(13 years)
Sector total 5.44 5.17 0.17 –0.21
AEGON Hungary Pension 
Fund 4.81 4.12 –0.42 –1.21
Allianz Hungary Pension Fund 5.42 5.72 0.16 0.33
Aranykor National Voluntary 
and Private Pension Fund 5.66 5.43 0.38 0.05
AXA Pension Fund 5.52 5.45 0.25 0.06
Budapest National 
Mandatory Private Pension 
Fund 
4.24 3.83 –0.98 –1.52
Dimenzió Private Pension 
Fund 5.98 5.81 0.67 0.35
Életút First National Pension 
Fund 6.88 7.26 1.52 1.72
Erste Voluntary and Private 
Pension Fund 3.81 3.56 –1.36 –1.66
Évgyűrűk Private Pension 
Fund 1.70 1.49 –3.39 –3.70
Generali Private Pension 
Fund (established in 2008) n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Honvéd Voluntary and 
Private Pension Fund 3.47 3.53 –1.53 –1.83
ING Pension Fund 6.45 6.09 1.13 0.63
MKB Pension Fund 6.45 5.93 1.13 0.51
OTP Private Pension Fund 6.21 5.86 0.90 0.44
Postás Private Pension Fund 6.86 6.98 1.50 1.46
Quaestor National Private 
Pension Fund 3.33 2.87 –1.83 –2.34
Vasutas Pension Fund 6.30 5.87 0.97 0.41
Pension Fund of Electric 
Energy Industry Companies 6.28 6.57 0.96 1.09
Source: Kormanyzati Ellenorzesi Hivatal (2011, pp. 45–46)
Today, both internationally renowned financial experts and journalists ask 
what the point of the whole system is if no positive benefit can be expected 
from retirement savings (Flood, 2013). 'Not only did the mandatory private 
pension funds system not solve the problems of the already defective 
Hungarian pension funds system, but it became another severe social and 
economic problem itself…The amount of operational costs and unrealised 
profits is around 850 billion HUF' (Magyarorszag Kormanya, 2012, p. 4).
It also became clear that the solution of problems with demography and low 
economic activity cannot be postponed or swept under the rug on the pretext 
of reforming the pension system. These problems must be solved as soon 
as possible independently of the difficulties of operating the pension funds 
system. Similarly to all Member States of the European Union, Hungary faces 
a severe demographic crisis, the estimated life expectancy increased around 
217Mednarodna revija za javno upravo, letnik 14, št. 2–3/2016
Main Reasons for the Transformation of Mandatory Hungarian Private Pension Funds
5 years during the last 50 years and it is predicted to increase by 7 years by 
2060. In addition to the low number of births, there is a dramatic change of 
the age composition of the population, resulting in an ageing society. One 
of the consequences of these phenomena is that the old age dependency 
ratio will be doubled: currently, the EU average of the amount of people of 
active age per person above 65 years of age is four (the situation in Hungary 
is worse), while it is expected to be only two by 2060 (Prugberger & Barta, 
2015). In addition, in the European Union the level of employment was the 
lowest in Hungary. According to 2010 data, the Hungarian employment level 
was 8.7% lower than the EU average. Of the new Member States of the EU, 
the level of employment increased by nearly 10% in Bulgaria and by nearly 
8% in Poland between 2002 and 2010, while that of Hungary decreased (by 
0.5%) in the same period (Novoszath, 2014). For this reason, in 2010, the new 
Hungarian government declared that they want to solve this problem by 
focusing the Hungarian economic policy on two areas: increasing employment 
and stopping population decline (Nemzetgazdasagi Miniszterium, 2011).
By the end of 2010, Hungary faced a dilemma due to the obligation of the 
EU’s mandatory targeted budget deficit of 3.8% by 2010 and 3% by 2011 and 
the constantly increasing deficit caused by private pension funds. Hungary 
had to choose whether to eliminate and nationalise (similarly to Argentina) 
second-pillar of pension system or to follow IMF’s recipe and the practice 
of the preceding government and further reduce pensions. However, the 
Hungarian government chose a third solution by not nationalising the private 
pension funds, but removing the protective screens of the state from them. As 
a result, the government does not guarantee private pension funds that their 
members will benefit even if their private pension funds make unfavourable 
financial decisions. Private pension funds still had the opportunity to provide 
above average pensions to their clients, but they lost all state-guarantee and 
had to fight real market risks. Also, this change made it possible to stop the 
decrease of the real value of pension in the case of those in the state pillar.
Table 5: Table 5: Change of Hungarian pensions in real terms (percentage)
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Change of real 
income 13.6 9.2 –1.1 6.3 3.6 –4.6 0.8 –2.3
Change of pensions 
in real terms 10.0 8.6 3.3 6.3 3.0 –2.2 1.8 –6.4
Source: Hungarian Central Administration of National Pension Insurance (2015, p. 17)
In the majority of cases, retirement is equal to poverty in Hungary. The 
conditions and consumption possibilities of pensioners are similar to those 
who have low income from many aspects. In 2010, 650 thousand pensioners 
lived under the poverty line in Hungary (Zentai, 2010). These people could 
not heat their homes and eat warm meals. The majority of them were lonely 
old people living in small villages. They could decide whether to spend on 
medications and food or turn the heat on. The value of pension in real terms 
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reached the 1989 level by 2003. The value of pension in real terms increased 
between 2004 and 2006, while both income and pension decreased in real 
terms in 2007. Real income increased by 0.8% in 2008. In 2009 a result of the 
reduction and phasing out of the 13th month salary pension in real terms 
decreased by 6.4%. The decrease of pension was more significant than that 
of real income.
In the Hungarian economic literature, several theories have emerged with 
regard to the appropriate directions for pension scheme reform. There was 
a general consensus that a social element, i.e. a basic pension protected by 
constitutional law, was necessary; however, incentives should include an 
element of pension contributions proportional to wages (Rab, 2014). Even 
until this point of time, private pension funds provided a better service and 
higher pensions only for people whose income had been above the average. 
Those who became unemployed and people who had been discriminated in 
the labour market in the first place (Roma people, those above 50 years of 
age, women, women with children, disabled people, etc.) or people whose 
income had been lower in the first place, had to face lower pension. For this 
reason, more than 60 000 people were forced to step back into the state pillar 
directly before their retirement in late 2009, when this option was available 
for the first time.
4 Legislative Changes of the Restructuring of the 
Hungarian Pension Fund System
In late 2010, the government discussed the conceptual issues of implementing 
the pension reform; they reviewed the duties in relation to the free choice of 
pension funds and agreed to the restructuring of the pension funds system. 
Government Resolution No. 1281/2010. (XII. 15.) about the conceptual 
directions of implementing the pension reform and the tasks in relation to 
the free choice of pension funds, as follows:
• in order to provide financeability in the short, medium and long run, 
Hungary returns from the three-pillar system to the two-pillar, solidarity 
and voluntary funded pension system also operated by 18 EU Member 
States;
• in addition to the state pillar, the voluntary pension insurance funds 
based on voluntary contribution will be maintained and strengthened;
• relieving the Pension Insurance Fund of non-pension related, but social 
payments and having these payments managed by the central budget;
• making legislative changes so that pension can only be funded from 
amounts paid for pension purposes and no other revenues of the 
budget may be charged for this purpose; also, contributions paid into 
the social security pension fund can only be spent on pension payments;
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•	 the	expenses	of	the	reform	are	financed	by	the	merging	of	the	state	
and	semi-state	pillars	while	declaring	that	other	budgetary	resources	
cannot	be	used	for	the	same	purpose.
The	possibility	of	returning	to	the	state	pillar	was	provided	even	to	those	who	
retired	before	1st	 February	2011	and	were	provided	 retirement	allowance	
in	 their	 own	 right	 concerning	 their	 membership	 in	 private	 pension	 funds.	
Based	on	the	legislative	background,	previous	private	pension	fund	members	
returning	to	the	social	security	pension	system	were	provided	the	real	return	
of	their	savings	for	pension	purposes	or	they	had	the	opportunity	to	transfer	
this	amount	to	a	voluntary	pension	insurance	fund	or	to	an	individual	account	
to	be	established	in	the	social	security	pension	system.	The	private	pension	
fund	members	whose	real	return	was	negative	and	returned	to	the	solidarity	
pillar	 of	 the	 state	 were	 provided	 their	 whole	 pension	 contributions	 plus	
inflation	as	if	they	had	not	even	left	it	in	the	first	place.
Act	 no.	 CLIV	 of	 2010	 established	 the	 legislative	 background	 of	 individual	
accounts	 in	 the	 social	 security	 pension	 system.	 The	 rules	 determined	 the	
method	of	pension	system	restructuring	 in	detail:	the	private	pension	fund	
members	who	wanted	 to	maintain	 their	private	pension	 fund	membership	
had	to	make	a	declaration.	The	most	accentuated	part	of	the	Act	was	the	one	
which	specified	that	those	who	did	not	return	to	the	social	security	pension	
system	 still	 had	 to	 fulfil	 their	 obligation	 to	 pay	 contributions	 to	 the	 given	
private	pension	fund	(10%,	i.e.	the	whole	amount	paid	by	an	employee)	after	
31st	December	2011.	According	to	the	plans,	the	given	employee	would	not	
have	been	entitled	to	pension	benefits	from	the	social	security	pillar,	thereby	
'contracting	out'	of	 the	state-funded	social	 security	 system	 (as	a	matter	of	
course,	the	obtained	rights	of	the	employee	would	not	have	been	infringed	
upon,	i.e.,	they	would	still	have	been	entitled	to	the	social	security	benefits	
earned	 up	 to	 this	 point).	 It	 was	 an	 important	 element	 of	 this	 Act	 that	 it	
specified	a	rule	which	compensated	for	the	14-month-long	suspension	of	the	
transfer	of	private	pension	fund	membership	fees:	the	whole	amount	of	the	
pension	benefits	for	this	period	were	paid	from	the	state	pillar.	The	freedom	
of	choosing	pension	funds	made	it	possible	for	all	fund	members	to	step	back	
into	the	social	security	pension	system.	Around	3	million	people	stepped	back	
into	 the	 social	 security	 pension	 system	 and	 the	 Central	 Administration	 of	
National	Pension	Insurance	(ONYF)	provided	all-inclusive	information	to	the	
members	concerning	this	action	(Nemzetgazdasagi	Miniszterium,	2012).
These	changes	did	not	affect	the	third	pillar,	i.e.,	the	operational	frameworks	
of	 voluntary	mutual	 pension	 insurance	 funds.	 In	 addition,	 the	 government	
supported	 the	 transfer	 of	 real	 benefits	 and	membership	 fee	 supplements	
into	voluntary	mutual	pension	insurance	funds	with	tax	allowance.
Both	 the	 returning	of	 private	 pension	 funds	members	 into	 the	 state	 pillar	
and	 the	 transfer	of	private	pension	 funds	membership	 fees	 for	14	months	
resulted	 in	extra	 income	 for	 the	 social	 security	pension	 system,	which	was	
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partially a short-term and also a long-term extra resource. On the one hand, 
this amount reduced the increasing deficit of the social security pension 
system, while it was spent on reducing the state debt on the other. The 
extended scope of budgetary action made it possible to make measures 
needed for launching economic growth and for providing stable grounds for 
the Hungarian economy.
As a result of the legislative amendment in late 2011, the possibility of 
returning to the state pillar was provided to private pension fund members, 
the number of private pension fund members decreased below 75 000.
5 Conclusions
The Hungarian pension reform which entered into force on 1st January 
1998 significantly contributed to increasing the budgetary deficit and the 
state debt. One of the main lessons learned from the failure of the partial 
privatisation of the Hungarian pension funds is that such comprehensive 
restructuring should not have been performed before preliminary and all-
inclusive social and economic impact assessment. It is also very revealing that 
more than 12 years had to pass before this unbelievably unjust and money-
wasting system which contributed to the indebtedness of the county could 
finally be abolished. Restructuring the previous mandatory private pension 
funds system was an especially significant initial step from the aspect of 
consolidating the severe financial situation of the country. Debt reduction 
should be constant and significant and a strong pension system has to be 
established which is able to provide the necessary protection in the long run in 
order to maintain the value of pensions in real terms also in the case of future 
recessions. It is necessary to develop a long-term pension strategy whose 
implementation calls for the proper tools and the necessary wealth in order 
to avoid current and future negative economic impacts. The compensation 
for labour market inequalities and ensuring gender equality is another 
important issue to be solved. In order to do this, it is important to develop a 
general pension calculation system which is independent of individual labour 
market preliminaries, while the realisation of labour market advantages could 
be performed by the voluntary section in the future. However, in addition 
to solving short term problems and challenges, the Hungarian pension 
system will be working in a stable and sustainable way in the long run only 
if the currently prevailing unfavourable proportion of active and inactive 
people can be altered drastically in Hungary and if the number of labour 
market newcomers would permanently surpass the number of those leaving 
the labour market. Also, the currently declining demographic trend would 
need to be reversed. None of the Hungarian governments in office before 
2010 realised that the extension of employment, the reduction of economic 
inactivity among the active population and the increasing number of births 
are the key factors of the growth of the Hungarian economy and the financial 
stabilisation of the Hungarian pension system.
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Hungary's example confirms that the mandatory private pension system will 
not automatically solve the problem of aging and will not make the pension 
system more sustainable. Another important lesson from the studies to take 
up the case of private or public pension systems is that without adequate and 
verifiable performance requirements of output growth can not be achieved. A 
good example of such a performance measurement and evaluation system is 
the activity of Canadian Public Sector Investment Board where the application 
provides a variety of customized benchmarks for the Canadian pension fund 
ongoing value creation (PSP Investments, 2015). The requirement that the 
management requires the minimum of benchmark levels of performance 
and only just recognized performance above the benchmark level.  It is also 
an example of this just the other side of the Hungarian mandatory private 
pension funds because they were not able to over one and a half decades 
of operation at least bring a minimum contribution to the resources of the 
contributors, not to the merits.
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POVZETEK
1.04 Strokovni članek
Glavni razlogi za preoblikovanje madžarskih obveznih 
zasebnih pokojninskih skladov
Na splošno je veljalo, da so naložbeni pokojninski sistemi varnejši od 
dokladnega sistema. V nasprotju s tem je danes znano, da je kriza finančnih 
in kapitalskih trgov negativno vplivala na obrestne mere, finančno stabilnost 
različnih skladov socialnega zavarovanja in na razvoj donosov. Posledice so 
bile zlasti resne za večstebrne pokojninske sisteme in donos pokojninskih 
sredstev. Glavni namen tega prispevka je prikazati jasen povzetek glavnih 
dejstev in motivov za prestrukturiranje financiranja socialnega zavarovanja na 
Madžarskem, ki poteka od leta 2010. 
Madžarska pokojninska reforma, ki je začela veljati dne 1. januarja 1998, je 
bistveno prispevala k povečanju proračunskega primanjkljaja in državnega 
dolga. Eden od glavnih naukov neuspeha delne privatizacije madžarskega 
pokojninskega sklada je, da se tako obsežnega prestrukturiranja ne bi smeli 
lotiti brez predhodne celovite ocene družbenega in gospodarskega učinka.
Po drugi strani se je madžarski pokojninski sistem do zdaj razvijal v tako smer, 
da obvezni zasebni pokojninski skladi, ki delujejo na podlagi naložbenega 
sistema, niso mogli rešiti težav, za odpravo katerih so bili vzpostavljeni. Poleg 
tega so povzročali še dodatne težave. Primer Madžarske potrjuje, da obvezni 
zasebni pokojninski sistem ne bo samodejno rešil težave staranja in ni poskrbel 
za večjo vzdržnost pokojninskega sistema. Toda ob reševanju kratkoročnih 
težav in izzivov bo madžarski pokojninski sistem na dolgi rok deloval stabilno 
in vzdržno le, če bo mogoče trenutno prevladujoče neugodno razmerje 
aktivih in neaktivnih ljudi na Madžarskem bistveno spremeniti in če bo število 
ljudi, ki vstopajo na trg dela, stalno presegalo število tistih, ki ga zapuščajo. 
Spremeniti bi bilo treba tudi trenutno upadajoče demografsko gibanje. 
Nobena madžarska vlada pred letom 2010 ni razumela, da so povečanje 
obsega zaposlovanja, zmanjševanje gospodarske nedejavnosti prebivalstva in 
povečanje števila rojstev glavni dejavniki za rast madžarskega gospodarstva in 
finančno stabilizacijo madžarskega pokojninskega sistema. 
Raziskava prinaša še en pomemben nauk, kar zadeva primer zasebnih ali javnih 
pokojninskih sistemov: brez ustreznih in preverljivih zahtev za uspešnost 
rezultatov rasti ni mogoče doseči. Dober primer takega sistema merjenja 
in vrednotenja uspešnosti je delovanje kanadskega odbora za pokojninske 
naložbe javnega sektorja (Public Sector Pension Investment Board), ki zagotavlja 
vrsto prilagojenih meril uspešnosti za stalno ustvarjanje vrednosti kanadskega 
pokojninskega sklada. Pogoj je, da vodstvo zahteva vsaj najnižjo raven meril 
uspešnosti in priznava le uspešnost, ki to raven dosega. Po drugi strani je 
madžarski obvezni zasebni pokojninski steber dober primer, da brez zahtev 
za uspešnost poslovanja ni vrednosti za državo in člane pokojninskega sklada.
